Source: OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 1–79Current language: EN
- Digital operational resilience in the financial sector
Basic legislative acts
- DORA regulation
Article 21 Centralisation of reporting of major ICT-related incidents
Summary What does Article 21 of the DORA regulation say?
This article sits within the broader incident reporting framework established by DORA and tasks the ESAs, working through the Joint Committee and in consultation with the ECB and ENISA, with producing a feasibility report on whether ICT-related incident reporting by financial entities could be centralised through a single EU Hub.
The article is essentially a scoping and research exercise — it does not itself create a Hub, but rather sets out what must be studied and reported upon, covering practical considerations such as costs, governance, interoperability, and membership conditions.
The report must be submitted to the European Parliament, the Council, and the Commission by 17 January 2025.
Important points:
- The ESAs are required to produce and submit a joint feasibility report on a centralised EU incident reporting Hub by 17 January 2025.
- The report must address a defined list of elements, including prerequisites, risks, interoperability, operational management, membership conditions, technical access arrangements, and a preliminary cost assessment.
- The stated goals of any such Hub would be to facilitate incident reporting flows, reduce associated costs, and enhance supervisory convergence.
Springlex's summary of the article, a reading aid, not a substitute for the legal text.
The ESAs, through the Joint Committee, and in consultation with the ECB and ENISA, shall prepare a joint report assessing the feasibility of further centralisation of incident reporting through the establishment of a single EU Hub for major ICT-related incident reporting by financial entities. The joint report shall explore ways to facilitate the flow of ICT-related incident reporting, reduce associated costs and underpin thematic analyses with a view to enhancing supervisory convergence.
The joint report referred to in paragraph 1 shall comprise at least the following elements:
prerequisites for the establishment of a single EU Hub;
benefits, limitations and risks, including risks associated with the high concentration of sensitive information;
the necessary capability to ensure interoperability with regard to other relevant reporting schemes;
elements of operational management;
conditions of membership;
technical arrangements for financial entities and national competent authorities to access the single EU Hub;
a preliminary assessment of financial costs incurred by setting-up the operational platform supporting the single EU Hub, including the requisite expertise.
The ESAs shall submit the report referred to in paragraph 1 to the European Parliament, to the Council and to the Commission by 17 January 2025.
Relevant recitals
Recital 22 Divergent incident reporting requirements
ICT-related incident reporting thresholds and taxonomies vary significantly at national level. While common ground may be achieved through the relevant work undertaken by the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) established by Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council(11) and the Cooperation Group under Directive (EU) 2022/2555, divergent approaches on setting the thresholds and use of taxonomies still exist, or can emerge, for the remainder of financial entities. Due to those divergences, there are multiple requirements that financial entities must comply with, especially when operating across several Member States and when part of a financial group. Moreover, such divergences have the potential to hinder the creation of further uniform or centralised Union mechanisms that speed up the reporting process and support a quick and smooth exchange of information between competent authorities, which is crucial for addressing ICT risk in the event of large-scale attacks with potentially systemic consequences.
Recital 24 Robust ICT-related incident reporting regime
To enable competent authorities to fulfil supervisory roles by acquiring a complete overview of the nature, frequency, significance and impact of ICT-related incidents and to enhance the exchange of information between relevant public authorities, including law enforcement authorities and resolution authorities, this Regulation should lay down a robust ICT-related incident reporting regime whereby the relevant requirements address current gaps in financial services law, and remove existing overlaps and duplications to alleviate costs. It is essential to harmonise the ICT-related incident reporting regime by requiring all financial entities to report to their competent authorities through a single streamlined framework as set out in this Regulation. In addition, the ESAs should be empowered to further specify relevant elements for the ICT-related incident reporting framework, such as taxonomy, timeframes, data sets, templates and applicable thresholds. To ensure full consistency with Directive (EU) 2022/2555, financial entities should be allowed, on a voluntary basis, to notify significant cyber threats to the relevant competent authority, when they consider that the cyber threat is of relevance to the financial system, service users or clients.
Recital 51 Streamlined ICT-related incident reporting
The propagators of cyber-attacks tend to pursue financial gains directly at the source, thus exposing financial entities to significant consequences. To prevent ICT systems from losing integrity or becoming unavailable, and hence to avoid data breaches and damage to physical ICT infrastructure, the reporting of major ICT-related incidents by financial entities should be significantly improved and streamlined. ICT-related incident reporting should be harmonised through the introduction of a requirement for all financial entities to report directly to their relevant competent authorities. Where a financial entity is subject to supervision by more than one national competent authority, Member States should designate a single competent authority as the addressee of such reporting. Credit institutions classified as significant in accordance with Article 6(4) of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013(19) should submit such reporting to the national competent authorities, which should subsequently transmit the report to the European Central Bank (ECB).
Recital 55 Feasibility of centralized incident reporting
The ESAs should be tasked with assessing the feasibility and conditions for a possible centralisation of ICT-related incident reports at Union level. Such centralisation could consist of a single EU Hub for major ICT-related incident reporting either directly receiving relevant reports and automatically notifying national competent authorities, or merely centralising relevant reports forwarded by the national competent authorities and thus fulfilling a coordination role. The ESAs should be tasked with preparing, in consultation with the ECB and ENISA, a joint report exploring the feasibility of setting up a single EU Hub.
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Definition
ICT risk
Definition
major operational or security payment-related incident
Definition
network and information system
Definition
cyber threat
Definition
Joint Committee
Definition
cyber-attack
Definition
significant cyber threat
Definition
group
Definition
credit institution
Definition
public authority
Definition
major ICT-related incident
Definition
operational or security payment-related incident
Definition
ICT-related incident
Definition
critical or important function
Footnote 19
Footnote 11